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ONE MEMBER'S REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TORT
COMMISSION
Alan B. Morrison*
If you're pestered by critics and hounded by faction
To take some precipitate, positive action,
The proper procedure, to take my advice, is
Appoint a commission and stave off the crisis.'
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1985, I received a telephone call from Professor Robert
McKay of New York University Law School, whom I have known for
about 10 years. He said the American Bar Association had formed a
Commission 2 to make recommendations for specific action on what some
were calling the "insurance crisis" or the need for "tort reform,"and he
asked me to become a member. Although Public Citizen, for which I
work, had taken some positions on the issues, as had the organization's
former president, Ralph Nader, I confessed that I had relatively little
experience in torts. I asked whether he wanted my views or my organization's, and I expressed concern about the time commitment.
His replies were disarmingly direct. He recognized that I did not have
an extensive background in the area, and that was one of the reasons he
wanted me and a number of others on the Commission-to provide
objective viewpoints on difficult problems. Second, he said we would
meet half a dozen or so times for two days each during the next year,
and our report had to be concluded by November 1986. Finally, he
assured me that he wanted my views and no one else's.
After giving the matter some thought, talking to others in Public
Citizen about my role and receiving assurances that my independence
would not cause insoluble problems, I agreed to join the Commission.
Although I endeavored to keep my colleagues informed, I did not always
agree with their positions, which led to at least one story memorializing
our differences.' Although I never discussed this matter directly with most
of the other Commission members, I feel confident that at least some of
the others felt similar pressures from their constituents to go along with,
or oppose, certain provisions being considered.
*
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The description that follows is nothing more than one member's
version. It is necessarily selective because of time and space limitations,
and it inevitably will emphasize events that were more important to the
author than to others. There undoubtedly will be differences among
Commission members about the accuracy of some of the details, but, I
hope, not on the general themes and broad propositions. If others do
dispute the details, their memories and notes are entitled to at least as
much credence as this account. Rather than trying to provide a complete
history of what occurred, I have attempted to convey the flavor of how
the problems were approached and the issues resolved.
The Commission's fifteen members were all lawyers. The group
included members of the plaintiffs' and defense bars, representatives of the
insurance industry, three judges (two federal and one state), and representatives of consumer and public interest organizations. The Commission
was perhaps as balanced as any group of its size could be, given the
inevitable differences of opinion on the issues.
In the account that follows, I have avoided identifying any members,
although those on the inside undoubtedly will be able to discern the
source of various positions. I chose to assign neither credit nor blame,
because most of the ideas were not the product of any individual, but
came out of group discussion in which no one could be identified as the
originator, or from a discussion in which the idea was put on the table
and changed so markedly 4that it would be inaccurate to ascribe it to the
person who first spoke it.
THE DIRECTIVE
In the beginning, we all recognized there were serious limits on our
work. The first was the time the members could devote. A pundit once
remarked that in order to be selected for a commission such as this, one
must prove himself too busy to serve. Whatever the truth of that saying,
most members of the Commission were able to devote a substantial amount
of time, but by no means more than a fraction of their working lives
during the year.
Second, we had a very tight deadline dictated in large part by the
desire of the ABA to have our report presented for action by the House
of Delegates at the February 1987 meeting. This meant we had to complete
our work by early December 1986 in order to have time for the report
to be circulated and considered by the relevant sections and committees
of the ABA.
Third, the backgrounds of the Commission members, although varied,
simply could not deal with all of the areas within our broad mandate.
Many of the members had tort experience-as litigators, academics, judges
and even clients-and others had other valuable backgrounds. But only
representatives of the insurance industry were familiar with the relevant
insurance issues.
4.

Not identifying members may lessen the problem of violating confidences, which I trust I have
not done anyway, even though there was not much confidential discussion.
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Finally, we were directed to be an action Commission, to produce
recommendations on which the ABA could vote and which could be
translated into improvements in the tort system in the immediate future.
Although the definitions of "action" and "improvements" are subject to
interpretation, there were significant limits on what we could do, or were
expected to do from the ABA's perspective.
In the end, a large part of what we were able to do was because of
the superb work of our reporter, Professor Robert Rabin of Stanford
Law School. Neither the reporter nor the Commission members could
undertake massive research 5 or read hundreds of new articles or conduct
detailed reviews and analyses of prior studies. In short, we had to base
our work on our experience and data, supplemented by the ability of
some members and the reporter to look into a few areas in greater detail.
Second, as an action Commission, we were hoping to make recommendations that the ABA could adopt. It was remarked several times that
the ABA would never accept a particular position, but that never kept us
from making a recommendation where we thought it was the right course
of action. On the other hand, although we had discussions on innovative
schemes for compensating victims of personal injuries, there appeared to
be a consensus that there was little interest in proposing an alternative
scheme that would replace, rather than improve, our tort system.
Third, the topic of availability and affordability of liability insurance
came up throughout the proceedings. New York state recently had completed a massive two-part study in which it said that both tort law and
insurance law needed revision. No one doubted the importance of reviewing the problem of insurance, but most of us felt tort law needed some
adjustments and changes, regardless of whether the insurance crisis could
be solved. Furthermore, we recognized that the so-called insurance crisis
was the "but for" cause of the creation of the Commission: it would
not have been created without all of the complaints about insurance.
On the other hand, we were constrained in our ability to deal with
insurance aspects of the problem because of time limitations and the lack
of expertise among the Commission members. Thus, fairly early on, it
was generally agreed that we would not make significant recommendations
in the insurance area. 6 Although I am certain it did not satisfy everyone,
the Commission decided to highlight the importance of the insurance issue
create a commission
by making our first recommendation that the ABA
7
to do for insurance what we had done for torts.
Fourth, we recognized we could not deal with everything that might
fall within the definition of tort law. Thus, we limited ourselves to physical
5.

6.
7.

Although the Commission had administrative assistance from Carolyn Taylor of the ABA Tort
and Insurance Practice Section in Chicago, we had no legion of lawyers to draft reports and
do independent research, and we had neither the time nor the money to procure outside
assistance.
At least that was my perception. Apparently, my views were not shared by all Commission
members, because at the end we almost came apart as a result of the lack of specific
recommendations made for the insurance part of the problem.
The Commission's approach also was used to deal with the problems of mass torts, which we
simply did not have the time, and possibly the expertise, to resolve.
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injuries and omitted the topic of libel law, as well as bad-faith refusal to
pay insurance claims and bad-faith discharge of employees, both of which
generally are considered to be torts. Again, this was largely a question of
time. Related to this, however, was our desire to avoid what had occurred
when the ABA rejected prior recommendations on medical malpractice
changes because the issue was separated from the broader context of
overall tort reform. Therefore, part of this decision may have been our
desire to not single out certain areas for special treatment. Our failure to
do so should not be seen as an indication that we rejected any separate
treatment of separate areas, except where our report explicitly states that
we had considered them and had done so.
THE CONCEPT
From the outset, it was apparent to me and to most of the others
that any report we produced would not fully satisfy any Commission
member or probably any observer. There were directly opposing views on
most issues that the Commission considered. Commission members often
were able to agree on goals, but they differed sharply on the means of
achieving them.
Commission members quite soon recognized that if a consensus were
to be reached, recommendations on individual topics should not be
included unless there was substantial support for them. In the end, there
was something each of us disliked in the package, and the question
became, was there anything that we really liked in it? It was not enough
that it was simply less bad than the alternatives; it had to include some
affirmative benefits to society, or at least the segments each of us
considered most important. Implicit in this approach was the recognition
that the impetus for the Commission had come from the defense bar,
because no one had been talking about giving victims more money or
increased rights. Nonetheless, I think it fair to say that most people agreed
that some reforms to help at least some victims had to be included in
order to make the package creditable and palatable.
After some early general discussions, the Commission asked the
reporter to put together our concepts and present them in both a discussion
format and as recommendations to be distributed in advance of Commission meetings and debated at length during them. Fortunately, the reporter
captured the sense of debates and developed a series of drafts of such
high quality that we could focus on substance rather than rewriting. Under
this process, we voted on individual items as they arose, with the understanding that each of us was reserving judgment on the package until the
end, when we would decide whether we could go along with the whole
set of recommendations.
One other insight into the issues became apparent to me and changed
my evaluations of some of the proposals. When I began, I thought that
the issues were divided between plaintiffs and defendants. But, as we
progressed, I recognized that there was a third distinct interest in the
matter that sometimes, but not always, overlapped: the interest of members
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of the bar in these issues. To some extent, the observation applied to
attorneys on the plaintiff and the defense side. All of them are a part of
the problem of high fees, inordinate delays, and business as usual instead
of innovation. Most of the public criticism and suggestions, however,
were directed toward plaintiffs' attorneys rather than defense counsel.
Seen in this light, some of the changes will help victims, but will do so at
the expense of their attorneys, rather than the defendants.
Interestingly, the suggestion that had received the most prominence
in the press received no support from the Commission: a cap on plaintiff's
attorneys fees. It was rejected without a formal vote, largely because it
was considered not helpful to defendants, potentially harmful to victims
if their attorney lost the financial incentive to fight on, arbitrary if
percentage limitations were used, and difficult if not impossible to manage
were any more complicated formulas used. Nonetheless, we recognized
that something had to be done about attorneys fees, so we provided some
alternatives described below.'
SELECTED ISSUES
No useful purpose would be served by tracing the history of our
debates on all the issues. Indeed, a full history of any one of the issues
probably would be far more burdensome than beneficial. Nonetheless,
some selected discussion about how we proceeded and reached our consensus may be of some help to those who want a fuller understanding of
what we did and why, or it may help those who serve on future commissions and want some guidance on what to do and not to do on them. 9
Attorneys Fees
The Commission rejected any attempt to put a cap on fees, and no
one spoke in favor of a requirement that they be justified as reasonable
to the court or some other body in every case.10 One area we agreed upon
quite early was the need for providing greater information to clients,
principally plaintiffs, before they hire counsel in personal injury cases. 1
Accordingly, we recommended that a disclosure statement, which would
be approved by the state's highest court, be made available to prospective
plaintiffs by the attorney before a fee agreement is entered.' 2 The text of
the disclosure statement was originally included in the recommendation
but was moved to the comments, which indicates that the draft statement
is simply illustrative of the kind of information that we think should be
8.
9.

10.
11.

See REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 25.
Because this commentary focuses on what the Commission did, it does not include what
happened after our final report was issued, including negotiations with other sections and the
changes that were made on the floor of the ABA's House of Delegates. Those changes are
important, but they are a different story, in which this member was involved only to a small
,degree.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, Comment (a).

12.

See id. at 27, Recommendation No. 7.
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available, i.e., information about fee options so the client will think about
them before a retainer agreement is signed, rather than after. 3
A second area of concern about attorneys fees was the practice of
some lawyers of taking a percentage of their fee out of the gross award,
rather than out of the net award.' 4 Because most clients do not read fee
agreements, and surely do not appreciate the difference between net and
gross at the time they sign them, disclosure is unlikely to be useful. In
our view, use of a percentage of the gross recovery casts the profession
in a bad light, especially when a case was tried or settled and the attorney
ended up with more than the client. Despite pleas that the practice was
common, we recommended that percentages be taken only out of the net
award and that a mandatory rule be adopted. 5
Perhaps our most controversial recommendation in the fee area is to
have post-judgment review of the reasonableness of fees.16 Unlike earlier
recommendations, this will apply to counsel for plaintiffs and defendants.
In some ways, the recommendation is unnecessary because courts always
have recognized their power to review attorneys fees for reasonableness.
But the power is virtually unused, mainly because in most cases there will
be contracts for fees, and the courts are reluctant to go behind them,
whether they are for contingent fees or on another basis. Moreover, even
if in theory they could be attacked, most clients are unwilling to do so
after the case has been concluded, particularly when the plaintiff has
received a recovery and has signed a statement agreeing to the payment
of an attorney's fee. Even for a defendant for whom all the payments
may not have been made, there is simply no desire in most cases to reopen
a controversy and fight about legal fees.
The Commission recognized that to be effective, the proposal would
have to involve an opportunity for courts to raise the issue on their own.
To do that, courts would have to receive information from both sets of
counsel to preliminarily assess whether the fees for either side were too
high. If they were, further proceedings would be required.
One obvious weakness of our proposal is that it does not encompass
settlements as well as judgments. This was recognized as a serious problem
because in many situations, a settled case will produce the most unreasonable fees, particularly on a contingent basis, when the settlement occurs
early in the process. Nonetheless, we agreed that this idea should be
presented as a first step in the direction of controlling fees, for without
it there was no chance that fees would come under greater scrutiny, and
they would continue to spiral upward. Although I supported the recommendation as an innovative way of dealing with the problem, I do not
expect that it will be swiftly enacted into the rules of practice of any
jurisdiction, because it goes so much against the grain of the way lawyers
have always handled their fee matters with clients. But at least the idea
13.
14.
15.
16.

See
See
See
See

supra note 12 and accompanying text.
id. at 29, Comment to Recommendation No. 8.
id. at 29, Recommendation No. 8.
id. at 29, Recommendation No. 9.
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pointed to a problem and challenged others to find an alternative solution
to it.
Pain and Suffering
Perhaps the most volatile issue the Commission faced was a cap on
pain and suffering damages. 17 A number of states already had enacted
caps, some limited to .medical malpractice and some more general, and
the Justice Department had proposed a $100,000 ceiling on all pain and
suffering recoveries.
Based on our review of existing data, which was by no means
complete, we concluded that median awards had not increased significantly
compared with the cost of living. Average awards had gone up a good
deal more,' 8 largely as a result of the increase in awards at the high end
of the spectrum. We also were concerned about anecdotal evidence that
had appeared in the press, much of which turned out to be inaccurate,
but which, nonetheless, affected public perceptions. Both the increase in
the number of high verdicts (some of which were drastically reduced on
appeal) and the often inaccurate anecdotes were considered by many to
have been a factor in higher settlement costs.
Despite the widespread concern about high awards and the pressure
to impose a ceiling,' 9 no one seriously advocated that the Commission
recommend a cap on pain and suffering awards. Everyone seemed to
recognize the arbitrariness of caps and the unfairness of penalizing the
most seriously injured. Indeed, there was some concern on the defense
side that caps could become floors as well as ceilings, especially if juries
were told about them. Nonetheless, we could not refuse to address the
issue. Hence, we took two steps, one directed at pain and suffering
awards, 20 and one directed at the related issue of joint and several
liability 2 which becomes most acute where there are large pain and
suffering awards.
One problem the Commission recognized with pain and suffering was
that juries get no guidance on it, in contrast to the relatively specific
instructions given for other aspects of liability and damages. In our
discussions, we seriously considered recommending that guidelines be
established and that judges instruct juries concerning the reasonable range
of pain and suffering in each case. 22 Such instructions would not be
binding, and juries would be told specifically that they could go above
or below them. 23 The obvious message, however, would be that juries
ought not do so, except in unusual cases.

17. See id. at 10.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 20-25.
22. See id. at 15, Recommendation No. 4.
23. Id.
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A related proposal would have collected data on awards for pain and
suffering in cases that went to verdict, but not for settled cases. 24 The
idea was to develop reasonably detailed information and, eventually,
guidelines similar to those that have been used to improve the consistency
of criminal law sentences.
There were obvious complications in developing these proposals,
including whether the entity that would prepare the guidelines would be
local, state or national, how to compare different kinds of injuries, and
how settlements could be taken into account. Nonetheless, we thought
that they were solvable with experience and thought. We also were hopeful
that the existence of guidelines would help settle cases, as well as control
verdicts. But many on the Commission were concerned that allowing
judges to suggest ranges for pain and suffering gave them too much
power.
In the end, we included this proposal only as a possibility in the
discussion portion, but at least we produced an idea that, so far as we
were aware, had not previously surfaced and now can be considered in
other forums. What we did recommend, which may have some effect but
is not likely to have an enormous impact, is to urge that courts exercise
more control over generous and inadequate verdicts through greater use
of additurs and remittiturs. 25 We recognized that, in all probability, most
of the control would be toward reducing rather than increasing verdicts,
assuming that the latter is possible in the particular jurisdiction in the
light of the right to trial by jury. Although we recognized that there was
at least a perception problem, because this recommendation goes in
basically one direction, we were not able to devise another solution that
would be acceptable and workable in the real world.
Joint and Several Liability
On the issue of joint and several liability, which we considered both
as a separate issue and as part of the pain and suffering controversy,
there were two competing considerations. The problem as it was presented
to us was that in some cases, a defendant who was minimally liable could
end up paying 100% of a massive judgment when the other tortfeasor
turned out to be uninsured, underinsured or unlocatable. On the one
hand, it was argued that it was unfair to make such a defendant fully
liable for a huge award, and the other side argued that the denial of
compensation to the innocent victim was at least as unfair, if not more
so.26

In the end, we drew some lines that were arbitrary but represented a
compromise between these two difficult alternatives. First, we decided
that non-economic damages, i.e., pain and suffering, should be treated
differently than lost wages, medical expenses, etc. We recommended that
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 14, Recommendation No. 3.
See id. at 13, Recommendation No. 2.
See id. at 22.
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joint and several liability be retained for the latter, no matter how
disproportionate responsibility was among the defendants, in order to
ensure that those damages are fully paid for the plaintiff. 27 On the rest
of the damages, we recommended that joint and several liability be
abolished, but only where there were substantially disproportionate shares
of the liability among the defendants, in which case the lesser liable
defendant would pay only its share. 21 We recommended twenty-five percent
as our cutoff, not because that is a magic number, but to indicate that
we did not want the rule to be kicked in at either five percent or fortyfive percent.
In a way, this recommendation was typical of what the Commission
tried to do: to find a compromise position that may have had intellectual
weaknesses from a doctrinal perspective, but was politically palatable and
might alleviate if not eliminate the worst aspects of the problem. 29
Collateral Source Rule
Another damage-related issue the Commission faced, and on which
we came out differently from where we started, was the collateral source
rule.30 Under it, a plaintiff is entitled to recover for an item such as
medical expenses, even if those expenses are paid by someone else, typically
an insurance carrier. Despite the double payment, the rule has been
justified on the ground that the opposite rule would result in a windfall
to the defendant. 3' In addition, before the days of extensive insurance
coverage and other reimbursement plans, the typical plaintiff would not
have much in the way of collateral sources. Today, the critics of the rule
argue, there is subsLantial potential for double recovery,32 and that is
unfair.
Commission members found that the more we looked at the collateral
source rule, the more complicated the problem became. For instance,
although eliminating double recovery sounds imminently fair in theory, it
makes a good deal less sense when the double recovery is as a result of
protection for which the victim has paid.33 Thus, a plaintiff who has paid
for automobile insurance and whose car is destroyed as a result of the
defendant's negligence is not receiving a windfall; indeed, to allow the
defendant to escape liability in that situation would give the defendant a
windfall.3 Similarly, beyond the coverage for which the plaintiff has paid,
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 23, Recommendation No. 6.
Id.
To some members of the Commission, the problem of joint and several liability was in significant
part due to the under insurance or lack of insurance of many automobile owners. To them, the
insurance problem could be and should be dealt with separately, and if done so, could largely,
although not entirely, eliminate this joint and several liability issue.
See id. at 22 (note); see generally id., App. B.
See id. App. B at B-2.
Id. App. B at B-I.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Of course, that is an over simplification -because a plaintiff rarely will have paid in premiums
100% of his or her recovery. But the problem of calculating which portion should be attributed
to the plaintiff and which to everyone else underscores the difficulty in arriving at a perfect
solution.
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medical insurance often is paid at least in part by an employer.35
Furthermore, the issue is complicated by the law of subrogation. The
Commission heard conflicting versions of how effective subrogation is,
although most people seem to agree that for small amounts, subrogation
is not cost-effective for most insurance carriers. Some Commission members defended the present rule on the ground that it does not provide a
windfall for the plaintiff, but simply insures that the victim receives a
6
full recovery, after payment of attorneys fees and other expenses.1
For a considerable time, the Commission had a draft recommendation
that, as a form of rough justice, provided that payments from collateral
sources up to $25,000 would be disregarded, but the defendant would be
able to reduce the judgment by any amount over that. Commission
members recognized this was a political compromise, but one designed to
prevent the worst abuses, without undercutting the other important interests at stake. Ultimately, the proposal was rejected because it did not do
much, and it created another level of complexity. Other alternatives were
rejected, also on the grounds that they were not fair and practicable. In
addition, most Commission members thought that the worst cases of
windfall could and should be dealt with by subrogation: If the insurance
companies did not care, then it was not a problem of unjust payment for
the plaintiff, but simply the failure of an insurance company to collect
the amounts to which it was rightfully subrogated. As a result, we made
no recommendations in this area.
Our discussions of the collateral source rule reflected a theme that
appeared often, if not on every issue. There was a perceived problem and
often a real one, but the solutions offered were no better than the existing
situations. Indeed, fairness and justice often do not sit neatly with
simplicity, and the cost of evening out inequities is, too often, far greater
than the harm from leaving small ones in place.
Punitive Damages
On the issue of punitive damages, we also did not maintain a steady
course, although we did come out with a recommendation in the end. As
with our discussions on pain and suffering, we rejected a cap on punitive
damages3 7 but recommended that courts exercise greater control in reducing
the amounts when they were inappropriate. 38 We also recognized the
unfairness of multiple punitive damages if each jury awarded them on
the assumption that no one before or after would do likewise. We viewed
this issue as having to do with the problem of mass torts. Although we
made a general recommendation on the unfairness aspect, we left it to
the proposed mass tort commission to develop a procedure to insure that

35.
36.
37.
38.

That, too, is an overstatement, because the worker generally receives medical insurance as part
of an overall compensation package.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
See id at 19, Recommendation No. 5(e); see also id. at 20, Comment (e).
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punitive damages are adequate, but not excessive.3 9 We also recommended
some procedural changes to insure fairness, but the principal effect will
be on plaintiffs with punitive damages claims, who will lose leverage over
the defendants, at least at the settlement stage. 40
Our most difficult decision regarding punitive damages related to the
standard under which they should be awarded. The issue revolved around
the inclusion or exclusion of recklessness, with the paradigm case of
whether a drunk driver should be liable for punitive damages. On its
original vote, the Commission included recklessness within the category
of offenses for which punitive damages would be awardable, but it revised
that to insist upon a higher standard. 4l Whether the jurors understand
the difference between these standards is not at all clear. A Commission
member who specializes in tort litigation pointed out that regardless of
the standard, punitive damages are only awarded when the jury is outraged
by the defendant's conduct. Therefore, the precise legal standard is often
far less important in reality. The Commission also reviewed the available
data and concluded that most punitive damage awards are for intentional
torts or for bad-faith refusal to pay insurance claims. Thus, whatever the
standard, it was unlikely to significantly increase or decrease the number
of such awards.
Other Issues
Of course, there were a number of other significant issues, each with
its own history and rationale. Although some of those issues might be
worth including because of their substance, they would be unlikely to lead
to an increased understanding of how the Commission as a whole worked
and how it viewed its task. Examining them would, however, further
establish that the members of the Commission operated with open minds
throughout, considered minor tinkerings and far-reaching changes, recommended nothing that they thought would not make a difference, but
urged changes even if they thought ultimate enactment by the appropriate
body was remote. Although the results may not be pleasing to everyone,
or perhaps to anyone, there can be little doubt, at least from this member's
perspective, that the process was fair and open and that there was an
opportunity for anyone with an idea to present it, have it debated and
have it voted up or down.
THE DISSENTS
Because of the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect among the
Commission members, and because of the consensus-building skill of the
Chairman, I thought that any dissents would not create serious problems.
As the package evolved, I saw the pluses and minuses and concluded that
the recommendations as a whole presented a fair compromise. Some of

39.
40.
41.

See id. at 19, Recommendation No. 5(d); see also id. at 20, Comment (d).
See id. at 19, Recommendation No. 5(c); see also id. at 20, Comment (c).
See id. at 18, Recommendation No. 5(a); see also id. at 19, Comment (a).
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its elements would not have been part of my or others' proposal for a
legislative solution, but because that was not the test I thought should be
applied in casting my vote, I supported the final package.
With one exception, no member expressed an intent to dissent until
the last meeting, and in some cases not until after that. Perhaps it was
because of the spirit of cooperation and respect, but it seemed to me that
fundamental differences had been put aside and were not faced until the
end. When we finally were required to say aye or nay, four members
dissented 42 on the grounds that the report tilted too much toward the
defense side. Had there been time for another meeting, we might have
changed some of those votes, either by persuasion or by changes in some
recommendations. But we did not. My principal concern about the dissents
was that they would make it less likely that the report would be adopted.
Although the report was changed before the House of Delegates approved
it, none of the changes go to the heart of our recommendations, so the
issue of the dissents is of little more than passing interest.
CONCLUSION
Now that the ABA has approved the report, with a few modest
changes, the Commission and the ABA are on record as proposing a
balanced package that, although not perfect, is something with which
everyone can live. Whether others will agree, and whether the legislatures,
and to some extent the courts, will accept this as a package, or destroy
the compromise by taking only parts of it, or do nothing at all, remains
to be seen. The Commission did what it set out to do; now the rest is
up to others.

42.

The four dissenters were Judge Jim R. Carrigan, Leonard Decof, Elaine Jones and Thomas
Lambert.

